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Theorists, Get Over Yourselves:
A Response to Steven D. Smith
Andrew Koppelman*

Steven D. Smith is one of our most powerful critics of contemporary
liberal theory. He has an acute sense of the hidden flaws and gaps in
contemporary conventional wisdom. Even those who disagree must, if they
are honest, carefully consider his arguments.
In his most recent work, he claims that in our political culture the case
for the specific protection of religious liberty—as opposed to liberty under
other descriptions—has been undermined.1 As a consequence, he fears that,
although some freedoms will survive, freedom of religion as such may cease
to exist.2
Even if his argument is sound, his fears are misplaced.
I just wrote a book defending the specifically American practice of
singling out religion for special protection,3 so I am unlikely to be persuaded
by a claim that the thing cannot be done. Stipulate, however, that my
argument there fails, and that there is no coherent theoretical case for special
treatment of religion. It hardly follows that the law’s special treatment of
religion is in any danger.
Smith is right that there is a major school of legal and political theory
that opposes special treatment.4 But he writes as if those people have
already won, or are certain to win, in American politics (as opposed to the
academy, where their view has indeed become hegemonic).5 Their view was
* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, Northwestern
University. Thanks to Steve Smith for years of conversations on these issues, which have been so
much fun that it would be a little sad if either of us finally managed to persuade the other.
1. See Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903 (2014).
2. Id. at 905.
3. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013).
4. Smith, The Last Chapter, supra note 1, at 904.
5. It is still contested by some. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized
Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (DIALOGUE) 71 (2013).
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unanimously rejected by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor.6 The
modern American law of religion is predicated on the premise that
religion—understood very abstractly—is a good thing.7
Smith thinks that secularism erodes religious freedom.8 The religious
justification for disestablishment destroys itself, because disestablishment
cannot act on its own justification.9 It rejects its own rationales.
Secularism, in some of its formulations, generates this paradox. Those
formulations are attractive to American academics who—for sociological
reasons having to do with modern American politics—are suspicious of
special treatment for religion and are drawn toward a neutralitarian
liberalism.10 But that is only one possible understanding of secularism.11 It
is not the understanding that has prevailed in American law.
Smith thinks that there is, on the other hand, a fundamental conflict
between religion and modern secular egalitarianism:
Traditional faiths typically teach that some people’s deeply held
beliefs are true while others are false. Often they will teach that
some people are saved and others are not, and that some ways of
living are acceptable to God while others are abhorrent. In these
ways, traditional religion in its very essence will often be a scandal
and an offense against the whole ethos of contemporary liberal
egalitarianism, with its commitment to “equal respect” for all
persons and all ways of life or conceptions of “the good.”12
What makes the conflict irreconcilable is not merely the demand for
formal equality, or even equality in the marketplace, enforced by

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
KOPPELMAN, supra note 3.
Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 906.
Id. at 912–17.
KOPPELMAN, supra note 3, 150–51.
There is, of course, an enormous variety of possible understandings of secularism. See
TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY (2003);
COMPARATIVE SECULARISMS IN A GLOBAL AGE (Linell E. Cady & Elizabeth Shakman Hurd eds.,
2010); AHMET T. KURU, SECULARISM AND STATE POLICIES TOWARD RELIGION: THE UNITED
STATES, FRANCE, AND TURKEY (2009); ELIZABETH SHAKMAN HURD, THE POLITICS OF SECULARISM
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2008); Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND
ITS CRITICS 33 (Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998); .
12. Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 918.
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antidiscrimination law.13 It is that secular egalitarianism “is not content to
regulate outward conduct, but instead seeks to penetrate into hearts and
minds.”14
Smith is right. Liberalism has always been concerned with citizens’
character.15 Good liberal citizens must be able to distinguish reasonable,
inevitable disagreements from those that reflect prejudice or error.16 In order
to do this, they must develop a certain measure of ethical autonomy.17 In my
own work on antidiscrimination law, I have argued that the law’s goal
cannot be merely to regulate behavior.18 A racist culture will not even be
able to deliver the minimal Nozickian goal of equal protection of citizens’
lives, liberty, and property.19 Liberalism must aim to transform culture.
Specifically with respect to gay people, the aspects of culture that
demand transformation are the tendencies to regard them as vile
contaminants, whose welfare counts for nothing, who are appropriate targets
of violence.20 Those tendencies have been deeply entrenched in American
culture.21 But the effort to eradicate them is not in any tension with
Christianity, which equally condemns them.22
A standard—but unfair—rhetorical move within the gay rights
movement is to treat all its adversaries as mindless bigots (when only some
of them are).23 But that move is not a misdescription of religion so much as
a misdescription of conservative views about sexuality. Fair or unfair, it is a
move that is increasingly successful. Its success makes it less relevant to the
13.
14.
15.

See id. at 921–22.
Id. at 920.
See PETER BERKOWITZ, VIRTUE AND THE MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (2000);
STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990).
16. EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
24–33 (1997).
17. See id. at 39–42, 214–20.
18. See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY (1996).
19. See id. at 181–90.
20. Id. at 164–65.
21. Id. at 171.
22. Cf. Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 919–20.
23. This can take extreme forms, such as Chief Judge Walker’s finding of fact in the Proposition
8 case (which Smith quotes) that “‘religious beliefs that gay and lesbian relationships are [. . .]
inferior to heterosexual relationships harm gays and lesbians.’” Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra
note 1, at 921 (quoting Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(emphasis added)).
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status of religion, because increasingly, even very religious people are not
troubled by gay rights. To the extent that suspicion of religion arises out of
the gay rights struggle, that suspicion seems likely to abate as that struggle
does.24
The disrespect that religious exclusivism engenders is not news. Many
American religions have embraced, and continue to embrace, doctrines of
exclusive salvation, and these have not hamstrung American liberal
democracy.25 America has long been a counterexample to Rousseau’s
dictum that “[i]t is impossible to live in peace with people whom one
believes are damned.”26 Liberalism characteristically is determined to live
with such tensions. The standard free speech casebook is a catalogue of
illiberal speakers who, nonetheless, are allowed to proclaim their views.
There are, undoubtedly, incoherences in the standard story that
Americans tell themselves about religious liberty.27 Smith thinks if
something is intellectually incoherent, it is doomed.28 But the incoherence
of a practice’s justification is no basis for predicting that it cannot continue.
All minds are sometimes inconsistent, because absolute consistency involves
computational complexity that exceeds the capacity of any existing mind.29
Human beings live with inconsistency all the time. Diarmaid MacCulloch
observed that the Protestant Reformation had its deepest root in the doctrine
of predestination (developed a millennium earlier by Augustine)—a doctrine
in deep tension with obedience to the Catholic Church (which Augustine
inconsistently also embraced).30 The inconsistency endured for a thousand
years before it began making trouble in practice. Maybe American practice
cannot be justified. But it is likely to persist, whatever the scholars do.
Smith’s real concern is not merely inconsistency. He thinks that
secularism leads us to a condition in which we are fundamentally lost. He
thinks that our deepest moral convictions depend for “their sense and
substance” on “notions such as those that animated premodern moral

24. ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID
AND UNITES US 370, 414–18 (2010).
25.
26.

E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW RELIGION DIVIDES

See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 922.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: WITH GENEVA MANUSCRIPT AND
POLITICAL ECONOMY 131 (Roger D. Masters ed., Judith R. Masters trans., 1978).
27. See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 923–24.
28. See id.
29. See CHRISTOPHER CHERNIAK, MINIMAL RATIONALITY (1986).
30. DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION 103–08 (2003).
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discourse—notions about a purposive cosmos, or a teleological nature
stocked with Aristotelian ‘final causes,’ or a providential design.”31 This
incoherence, he thinks, begets moral disintegration.32 The soundness of this
diagnosis is a huge question, but the comparative claim about the relative
weaknesses of secularism is unsound. The question, whether moral
discourse can make sense without implicitly depending on such notions, is,
of course, an object of perennial contestation. Smith’s solution merely
displaces the lack of foundations to a different level, because there is no way
to demonstrate a purposive cosmos, providential design, etc. He thinks it is
“intellectually irresponsible” to stipulate the equal worth of persons—one of
the core commitments of liberalism—without some deeper foundation on
which that commitment rests.33 But he has the same problem. Why is it not
equally irresponsible to stipulate God, whose existence is hardly selfevident?34
Consistency matters. The efforts of political theorists to devise coherent
accounts of our practice and to imagine better ways of realizing our ideals
are valuable. It is good for a society to be awake, to know what it is doing
and why. Keynes was right when he observed long ago that political theory
in some sense rules the world.35 That is why I wrote Defending American
Religious Neutrality. Sometimes, if you can tell people a coherent story
about what they are already committed to, their behavior will change.
Culture wars are a struggle among elites,36 and elite opinion matters.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 26 (2010).
See id. at 26–27.
See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 913–14.
See Andrew Koppelman, Naked Strong Evaluation, DISSENT, Winter 2009, at 105.

Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who
hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few
years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared
with the gradual encroachment of ideas.
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 383
(1936).
36. This is one of the few points of convergence between James Davison Hunter and Alan
Wolfe in IS THERE A CULTURE WAR?: A DIALOGUE ON VALUES AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE
(2006). There are, of course, deep divides within the electorate, but those concern race as much as
religion. See id. at 93. The culture wars in politics are a battle among white voters who hold a
diminishing share of the electorate. See ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE POLARIZED PUBLIC?: WHY
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS SO DYSFUNCTIONAL 18–35, 62–82 (2012).
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But the big difference between the theorists and those they influence is
that most people are not troubled by theoretical difficulties. Smith’s gloom
overstates the efficacy of these theoretical debates. If we theorists decide
that the culture will automatically dance to our tune, then we need to get
over ourselves. We do not matter that much.
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